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1.2 Natural Disasters and Political Institutions 
see







Figure 1.1: Percentile Shares of Total Affected People in Different Types of 
Natural Disasters from 1950 to 2009 
Note:
Chapter 2  
2 The Shocking Origins of Political Transitions: Earthquakes 
2.1 Introduction 
What has so often excited wonder, the great rapidity with which 
countries recover from a state of devastation; the disappearance, in a 
short time, of all traces of the mischiefs done by earthquakes, floods, 
hurricanes, and the ravages of war ... all the inhabitants are ruined, 







2.2 Earthquakes, Income and Political Transitions 

2.2.1 Income Channel: The Indirect Effect of Earthquakes on Political 
Transitions 
A. Creative destruction vs. broken window hypothesis 
B. Income and political change: Autocratic vs. democratic transitions 
2.2.2 The Preparedness and Emergency Response Channel: The Direct 
Effect of Earthquakes on Political Transitions 
twin

2.3 Data and Measurement 
2.3.1 Data on Earthquakes 
natural disaster
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2.3.2 Data on Other Variables 
2.4 Empirical Analysis 




























2.5 Results and Discussion 























Figure 2.1: Shares of Death Toll and Total Affected Population in Earthquakes 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics* 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations





Table 2.2: Earthquakes, GDP per capita and Polity Measure 
Model 
Model 2.2-A: Effects of 
Death Tolls 
Model 2.2-B: Effects of 
Affected Population
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Notes:
−
Table 2.3: Death Tolls in Earthquakes GDP per capita and Polity Measure: Developing Vers








Polity2, t Population 
Normalised Total 
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Notes:
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Table 2.4: Trifurcation Effects of Death Tolls in Earthquakes: Robustness Checks by Using Different Sub
Model Model 2.4-A: Polity from –10 to 0 Model 2.4-B: Polity from 1 to 7 M
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Notes:
−
Table 2.5: Trifurcation Effects of Total Affected Population in Earthquakes: Robustness Checks by Usin
Political Regime 





















Table 2.6: Effects of GDP per Capita on Polity Measure: Robustness Checks by 
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LIML 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Dependent variable is Polity2, t 
Panel B: First Stage for Log GDP per Capita, t 
Notes.

Table 2.7: Death Tolls in Earthquakes, GDP per Capita and Polity Measure: 
Robustness Checks Regarding Ring of Fire Countries 
Model 
Model 2.7-A:  
Ring of Fire Countries Excluded 
Model 2.7-B:  



















Table 2.8: Total Affected People in Earthquakes, GDP per Capita and Polity 
Measure: Robustness Checks Considering Ring of Fire Countries 
Model 
Model 2.8-A:  
Ring of Fire Countries Excluded 
Model 2.8-B:  




















Table 2.9: Earthquakes, GDP per Capita, and Polity Measure: Inclusion of 
Frequency of Earthquakes 
Model 



















Table 2.10: Earthquakes, GDP per Capita, and Polity Measure: Exclusion of 
Major Earthquakes 
Model 
Model 2.10-A:  
Effects of Death Tolls 
Model 2.10-B:  





















Appendix 2.1: Data and Sources 













n based on 
Income 
  
Appendix 2.2: Additional Issues with the EM-DAT Dataset 
Addressing possible problems with the dataset:
Some other points for EM-DAT data: 
 
Appendix 2.3: Codes Used to Represent Countries 
Country Code Country Code Country Code 
Appendix 2.4: Construction of neighbour-weighted instruments 
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Appendix 2.5: Checking Exclusion Restrictions of Neighbour-weighted IVs 
Model A2.5.1: Direct Effects of Neighbours’ Polity2 on GDP per capita 






Death Toll, t 
Log Real GDP 
per capita, t 
Polity2, t Population 
Normalised Total 
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Notes.
−
Appendix 2.6: Total Affected Population in Earthquakes, GDP Per Capita and Polity Measure: Developin
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Notes.
 
Chapter 3  







3.2 Extreme Rainfall, Floods, Economic Conditions and 
Democracy 
3.2.1 Direct Effect: Extreme Rainfall, Floods and Democracy 




3.2.3 Indirect Effect: Extreme Rainfall–Democracy Nexus through 
Corruption 

3.3 Data and Measurement 




3.3.2 Data on Flood Intensity 
EM-DAT
3.4 Estimation Framework 









































3.5 Results and Discussion 











3.5.3  Extreme Rainfall, Food Price Index and Democracy Nexus 
see
3.5.4 Extreme Rainfall, Corruption and Democracy Nexus 
see
increases
3.5.5 Additional Robustness Checks 
A. Bifurcation Effects 
B. Sample Decompositions 
EM-DAT
C. Sub-Saharan Africa Sample 
3.6 Conclusion 

